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Most industrialized countries have increased access to abortion over the past 30 years. 
Economic theory predicts that abortion laws affect sexual behavior since they change 
the marginal cost of having risky sex. We use gonorrhea incidence as a metric of risky 
sexual behavior. Using a panel of 41 North American, European and Central Asian 
countries over the period 1980-2000, we estimate the impact of abortion law reform on 
risky sex. Compared to the most restrictive legislation that permits abortion only to save 
the pregnant woman’s life or her physical health, more liberal abortion laws are associated 
with at least thirty additional gonorrhea cases per 100,000 individuals. The marginal 
effect of laws which make abortion available on request is larger than the effect of laws 
which allow abortion on socioeconomic and mental health grounds. Our results are robust 
against a set of alternative sample constructions and model specifications. 
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Over the past few decades, most industrialized countries have extended the 
circumstances under which abortion services are legally available. As a result, some 40 
percent of the world’s population currently resides in countries that permit abortion on 
request. Another 25 percent has access to abortion on socioeconomic and mental health 
grounds which are in most cases broadly interpreted (Center for Reproductive Rights 2008).  
We examine the relationship between abortion access and sexual behavior for a 
sample of 41 North American, European and Central Asian countries. This work extends 
previous studies by Klick and Stratmann (Klick and Stratmann 2003, 2008) who examine the 
effect of abortion policies in the United States. In contrast to Klick and Stratmann, our panel 
allows us to consider the effects of a further class of abortion laws, namely abortion access 
that is conditioned on socioeconomic and/or mental health grounds. 
Because internationally comparable data on sexual behavior do not exist, we 
approximate risky sexual behavior using gonorrhea incidence. This proxy for risky sex is not 
only attractive because of data-availability; it also adds to our understanding of an important 
public health issue that has been largely ignored.  
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) there are 62 million new cases of 
Gonorrhea every year (World Health Organization 2001), and, for the United States, lifetime 
treatment costs for each case are estimated between $60 for men and $303 for women 
(Chesson et al. 2006). Untreated, gonorrhea can lead to pregnancy complications, infertility, 
blindness in newborns infected by their mothers, septicaemia, arthritis, endocarditis and 
meningitis (World Health Organization 2001).   Existing public health models of STD 
incidence ignore the behavioral effect studied here. If, as we hypothesize in this article, 
improved abortion access leads to higher STD-rates, there are health benefits from the 
introduction of programs that proactively safeguard against adverse effects of abortion 
liberalization.   2
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical background from 
which we derive our research question.  In Section III we give an introduction to abortion law 
and summarize the legislation and its reform in the 41 countries in our sample. Following this 
account, we present our systematization of abortion laws that forms the basis of our empirical 
analysis. The empirical approach to identify the relationship between abortion and gonorrhea 
incidence is illustrated in Section IV, and Section V discusses the data used in our estimation. 
Sections VI and VII present the econometric results and a set of robustness checks while 
Section VIII concludes. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Sexual behavior is commonly regarded to be a product of natural instincts and 
socialization.  Hardy and Zebin (1991), for instance, explain adolescent pregnancies as being 
determined by biological factors and longstanding family and community characteristics. In 
this work, incentive-driven, “economic” decisions generate little consideration. This is 
surprising, as changing environmental factors like laws and norms alter the costs and benefits 
of certain sexual behaviors. Given these changes, it is unlikely that behavioral patterns are 
affected only through long-term socialization. Rather, as we hypothesize in this paper, 
individuals’ natural dispositions are likely constrained by rational considerations of costs and 
benefits. A simple economic model predicts that a change in the cost of risky sex through 
abortion law reform causes rational individuals to adjust their sexual activities.  
In a formal framework, we assume that an individual’s utility (U) positively depends 
on the “consumption” of sex (S), and a composite good (X). We further assume that utility 
U(S, X) is concave in S. As we investigate the sexual behavior of heterosexual couples
1, the 
cost of sex (C) includes the risk of unwanted pregnancy that increases with every additional 
                                                       
1 A “couple” here defines any pair of individuals who engage in heterosexual sexual activities.   3
sexual encounter. In formal terms, the marginal cost of sex is positive. This framework 
generates a downward sloping demand curve for sexual activity.
2  Therefore, if the cost 
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The cost associated with unwanted pregnancy (C) goes beyond the financial burden of 
giving birth and raising a child. For example, pregnancy and motherhood can diminish 
earnings through their negative impact on educational opportunities and labor market 
participation (Angrist and Evans 1999). Further, the opportunity to give up a child for 
adoption does not avoid the physical and financial cost of pregnancy and delivery, and can 
cause additional cost in the form of emotional hardship.  
Induced abortion can reduce the costs of pregnancy and avoid those of motherhood. 
However, the procedure’s legal status is an important determinant of its cost, and therefore a 
component of the cost of risky sexual behavior. If access to legal and safe abortions is 
restricted, these costs increase as a result of higher search and pecuniary costs, an increase in 
health risks
3, and the threat of criminal prosecution for both providers and seekers of illegal 
abortions. Consequently, our theoretical model predicts more and riskier sexual activities 
under more liberal abortion regimes.
4 This does not imply that every individual facing a 
                                                       
2 Similar approaches to sexual behavior that base on costs and benefits are suggested, for instance, by Posner 
(1992) and Levine (2000). A more elaborate model which generates the same outcome can be found in Levine 
and Staiger (2002). In their model, the individual makes decisions sequentially. At the last stage, the individual 
will have an abortion if the abortion costs are lower than the costs of giving birth. Since the abortion option is 
available, the individual is less likely to use alternate forms of contraception when in engaging in sexual 
activities. 
3 The World Health Organization estimates that twenty million unsafe and illegal abortions are carried out every 
year, resulting in 78,000 maternal deaths and hundreds of thousands of disabilities. Today, since most developed 
countries have liberalized abortion-access, illegal abortion has primarily become a phenomenon of the 
developing world. See Cook and Dickens (1988), Cook et al. (1999), and Grimes et al. (2006). 
4 It is also possible to generate this prediction with a simple model of condom use. If we assume that individuals 
use condoms to prevent conception and contracting STDs but that condoms are costly, abortion availability 
lowers the contraceptive benefits of condoms without changing their STD prevention capacity. This implies that 
once abortion becomes more widely available, individuals will be less likely to use condoms. Consequently, a 
ceteris paribus increase in STD incidence is predicted.   4
liberal abortion legislature will show riskier sexual behavior. For those who reject abortion 
regardless of its legal status, policy changes might be irrelevant.
5 However, for our prediction 
to hold, it suffices if at least some individuals adapt their sexual behavior to a change in 
abortion-access. 
III. REVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS 
In the second half of the 20
th century, many countries have extended circumstances 
under which abortions are legally performed.
6 At the same time, there is a large variety of 
abortion legislation across countries. Adding to this diversity, similar written law does not 
necessarily coincide with equal abortion access because enforcement of the legislation can 
depend heavily on its interpretation through government, the judicial branch, and the medical 
profession.  
De jure abortion legislation is typically grouped into five categories (See, for example, 
Rahman et al. 1998). Starting with the most restrictive category, these are: abortion prohibited 
altogether or allowed only to save the woman’s life; permitted to preserve her physical health; 
permitted to preserve her mental health; permitted for socioeconomic reasons; and permitted 
on request.   
We now present a brief account of abortion legislation and reform in our sample 
countries.
7  
Our sample contains twelve former Soviet states. Since the end of the Soviet Union, 
none of these states has made substantial changes to the Soviet law of 1955 that permitted 
                                                       
5 However, even for those individuals, the cost of rejecting sexual intercourse increases when abortion becomes 
widely accessible (Akerlof et al. 1996). These individuals may thus increase their sexual activities because of the 
higher cost of rejecting potential sexual partners and not because of the reduced risk of unplanned motherhood. 
6 Investigating abortion policies worldwide, Cook and Dickens (1978, 1988), Cook et al. (1999) and Boland and 
Katzive (2008) identify 118 policy-changes towards liberalization for 1967-2007. During the same period, more 
restrictive policies were implemented only 13 times.  
7 Where not otherwise indicated, the following account draws from the United Nation’s 2002 International 
Review of Abortion Policies. See United Nations (2002).   5
abortion on request. The situation is similar for the four former Yugoslavian countries for 
which data is available. After Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Serbia and Slovenia continued the right to abortion on request.  
Six Central and Southeastern European countries in the sample changed their abortion 
laws during, or shortly before transition from communism, with five of them adopting 
abortion on request: In the 1980s, Albania only permitted abortion in cases of a serious threat 
to the woman’s life or her physical health.
8 This policy was abandoned immediately after the 
socialist government was removed in 1991 when abortion became available on request. From 
the 1960s, in Romania, abortion was legal only for medical reasons and narrowly defined 
socioeconomic reasons.
9 After ousting the Ceausescu regime in 1990, the new government 
declared abortion legal on request. In socialist Bulgaria, Hungary and, until 1986, 
Czechoslovakia, abortion was accessible on a number of socioeconomic grounds, including 
being unmarried.
10 Following Czechoslovakia (1986), Bulgaria (1990) and Hungary (1992) 
fully liberalized abortion soon after the end of communist rule.  
Poland is the only former socialist country that has continued to restrict abortion 
access. In fact, the democratically elected Polish governments have taken a tougher stance on 
abortion than their communist antecessors under whose rule abortion was legal in cases of 
unspecified “difficult living conditions”. In 1993, all socioeconomic grounds were eliminated 
from the law, so that abortion remained legal only to preserve the woman’s mental health. The 
socioeconomic grounds were briefly reinstated in 1997, but shortly after, a pro-life coalition 
regained the parliamentary majority and reestablished the restrictive 1993 law.  
                                                       
8 The restrictive policy had severe impacts on maternal health. Despite the governmental efforts to raise fertility, 
an estimated fifty percent of pregnancies ended in mostly self-induced abortion. As a consequence of the unsafe 
and unsanitary conditions of illegal abortions, maternal mortality ranked highest in Europe second only to 
Romania. The number of premature births was also abnormally high. 
9 Abortion on socioeconomic grounds required abortion seeking women to already have five children under their 
care or to be older than 45 years of age. 
10 For married women, the socioeconomic criteria included a minimum number of existing children, age 
(typically 40 or over), a serious sickness of the husband, disintegration of the family, and difficult economic 
conditions.    6
Like the Central and Southeastern European countries, Western Europe and North 
America have experienced a trend towards more liberal abortion laws during the 1980-2000 
period. With the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Italy
11, and The 
Netherlands
12, seven countries made abortion accessible on request throughout the entire 
sample period. Four additional countries have substantially altered their legal approach to 
abortion. Of these, Canada and Germany have changed their laws to permit abortion on 
request. Before abortion became available on demand in 1988, Canadian law permitted it only 
to preserve the woman’s health, including mental grounds. Since a request for abortion 
required a three member hospital committee’s approval, interpretation of the law and thus 
abortion access varied substantially between the Canadian provinces and healthcare 
institutions. Because of the committees’ extensive discretionary powers, the Canadian 
Supreme Court declared the existing law unconstitutional in 1988. Since then, abortion access 
has been unrestricted. The Western part of Germany operated under a law that allowed 
abortion on socioeconomic grounds since 1975.
13 This legislation contrasted with that of the 
German Democratic Republic where abortion was available on request. After unification, the 
separate legislations co-existed for almost three years until a Federal Constitutional Court 
ruling in 1993 made abortion available on request in the entire country.
14  
Up to the mid-1980s, when Portugal and Spain added physical and mental health 
provisions to their abortion laws, these two countries only permitted abortion to save the 
                                                       
11 The Italian law of 1978 does not explicitly allow abortion on request. However, the law leaves it to the woman 
herself to determine if continuation of the pregnancy would endanger her mental health, taking into account her 
state of health and living conditions. In practice, abortion access is limited by the possibility of conscientious 
objection for medical personnel. In the more conservative Southern parts of Italy, up to ninety percent of 
physicians opt out of performing abortions. See Cook et al. (1999) and Rahman et al. (1998). 
12 Prior to the 1981 reform which fully liberalized abortion, Dutch legislation did not permit abortion unless the 
woman’s life was at risk, although the law was not strictly implemented. However, since for the Netherlands 
data on gonorrhea incidence is only available from 1982 onwards, we are not able to consider the 1981 reform in 
our analysis. 
13 The socioeconomic grounds stipulated that a legal abortion may be obtained if the woman is in a state of 
“intolerable distress”, as determined by a physician other than the one performing the abortion. In reality 
however, there was substantial regional variance in abortion access. In the North, abortions on socioeconomic 
grounds were relatively easy to obtain, while access was more restricted in the Southern states. 
14 De jure, abortions continue to be illegal but are free from prosecution if the woman states that she is in a 
“situation of distress and conflict”.   7
woman’s life. Under Irish law, abortion is illegal under all circumstances except to save the 
woman’s life, giving the country one of today’s most restrictive abortion laws.
15 The abortion 
law of Cyprus allows a woman to end her pregnancy if it would cause her or any child she 
may already have physical, mental or psychological harm. Moreover, although not codified, 
socioeconomic grounds are also accepted. The situation in Cyprus is comparable to those in 
Israel and Luxembourg
16 where current legislation also permits abortion only on mental 
health grounds, but is interpreted so as to also include social reasons.  
Until 2003, Swiss law permitted abortion only in cases of a serious threat to the 
woman’s life or her physical or mental health. However, legal practice varied between the 
cantons: while in many cantons, abortion was virtually available on request, in others, 
abortion access was highly restrictive. In Finland, the socioeconomic grounds for legal 
abortion comprise any situation in which delivery and care of the child would place a strain 
on the woman. Iceland’s law also includes socioeconomic provisions which are however 
somewhat more restrictive.
17 Finally, Great Britain requires abortion-seeking women to bring 
forward a socioeconomic justification. In general, the law is interpreted rather liberally.
18 
To summarize the above, there is a great deal of variation in abortion laws and their 
interpretations. In our approach, we measure abortion access with a three category variable 
                                                       
15 An estimated 4,000 Irish women travel to England each year to obtain abortions. Information on abortion 
opportunities abroad could be legally disseminated by Irish family planning associations and other groups until a 
1990 Supreme Court ruling banned such activities. 
16 The Luxembourg law provides a conscientious objection clause that allows medical personnel to opt out of 
performing abortions on ethical grounds. Because most health facilities are run by religious orders refusing to 
perform abortions, abortion seeking women are often referred to abortion services abroad. 
17 The Swiss law stipulates that a woman can obtain an abortion for several reasons: if she has given birth to 
several children at frequent intervals and only a short time has elapsed since the previous birth; if she lives in 
difficult family circumstances owing to the presence of many young children or to the serious ill health of other 
persons in the household; or, if the woman cannot look after a child satisfactorily because of her youth or lack of 
maturity.  
18 For an abortion to be legal other than to save the pregnant woman’s life the British law requires two 
physicians to conclude that the pregnancy has not exceeded 24 weeks and that continuance of the pregnancy 
would endanger the woman’s, or her existing children’s physical or mental health, taking into account 
socioeconomic factors. 
Because of the rather liberal character of British abortion law, “abortion tourism” to Britain was a common 
phenomenon until abortion laws were also liberalized in most of Continental Europe, and is still taking place 
from Ireland today. In 1973, the annual number of non-residents seeking legal abortion in Britain peaked at an 
estimated 53,600.   8
which is based on written law.
19 The first category incorporates the most restrictive legislation 
that permits abortion only when the woman’s life or her physical health is at serious risk. 
These policies make it virtually impossible to obtain abortions at will. The second category 
comprises laws that make abortion available for mental health and socioeconomic reasons. 
We use this generic category because of the substantial variation within the mental health and 
socioeconomic provisions: as shown in our above account of international abortion laws, the 
reading of mental health is in most cases rather liberal, so that mental health grounds often 
implicitly include socioeconomic reasons. The third category covers all laws that permit 
abortion on request. For each country in our sample, Table 1 reports the coding of abortion 
legislation and the periods for which gonorrhea incidence data is available. Figure 1 shows 
how the abortion law categories have changed over time for our sampled and documents the 
trend towards more liberal abortion legislation in the sample. 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a change in the cost of sexual activity 
leads to changes in sexual behavior. Given a lack of data on sexual activities (see, for 
instance, Fenton et al. 2001 and Hewett et al. 2008), we exploit the fact that certain infectious 
diseases are primarily transmitted through sexual intercourse. With gonorrhea incidence we 
use the frequency of a prominent STD to proxy risky sexual activities. For a number of 
reasons, gonorrhea is attractive as a measure of sexual activities. It is one of the most frequent 
                                                       
19 The following categorization is based on the aforementioned five categories of the written abortion law. In 
addition to belonging to one of these categories, abortion laws also typically contain further provisions: Different 
third party authorization requirements involving physicians or committees of physicians, social workers, parents, 
or spouses in the abortion decision. Some laws make counseling and waiting periods mandatory. Financial 
support for the procedure also varies by country and by the reason for which abortion is obtained. While the cost 
of therapeutic abortions is commonly fully covered, abortions on request often are paid for privately. Moreover, 
direct charges for abortions are not the only way in which income can affect abortion access. Additional costs 
typically accrue when health facilities that perform abortions are remote. This occurs not only in countries with 
few abortion facilities, but also if conscientious objection clauses are permitted and invoked by a large part of 
physician in an area, like in Southern Italy or Luxembourg. Also, in federal systems that regulate abortion at the 
state level, access can vary geographically.   9
STDs
20 and time-series data are available for a large set of countries. Further, its latency 
period is short, minimizing the lag between infection and diagnosis and because it is easily 
cured, gonorrhea has simpler dynamics than other STDs (Klick and Stratmann 2003, 2008). 
Finally, in contrast to syphilis, gonorrhea is not primarily transmitted among homosexual 
individuals.
21 
With an unbalanced panel of 41 countries and 21 years from 1980 to 2000 we estimate 
the following regression equation  
it ε t ν i λ it γX it βA it GONRATE + + + + =         (2) 
The independent variable GONRATEit is the number of newly diagnosed gonorrhea 
cases per 100,000 individuals per year t and country i, and εit represents an idiosyncratic error 
term. We estimate these models with weighted least squares using a country’s population as a 
weight. 
Ait is the three-category abortion variable described above. In an alternative 
specification, Ait is an indicator variable that equals 1 if abortion is legal on request or for 
socioeconomic or mental health grounds and 0 if abortion is only legal to save the pregnant 
woman’s life or her physical health. Since we use in all specifications as our reference point 
the most restrictive regimes that only permit abortion to save the woman’s life or physical 
health, our theory predicts a positive coefficient β. 
The vector Xit contains control variables and γ is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients. The controls include two macroeconomic measures to capture a country’s level 
of societal development. Namely, we include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
2005 US-Dollars and the annual change in a consumer price index (CPI) measured by three 
indicator variables: between 5 and 25, between 25 and 100, and more than 100 percent. The 
omitted reference category is a change of less than 5 percent.  Theory does not provide clear 
                                                       
20 Global incidence is only higher for Trichomoniasis and Chlamydia (Gerbase et al. 1998). 
21 For the United States, the share of gonorrhea cases that are contracted through homosexual intercourse is 
estimated to be 20 percent, while for syphilis, it is three times as large (Center for Disease Control 2006).   10
guidance for the signs of coefficients on income and inflation. On the one hand, poverty and 
economic volatility may coincide with a shortage in contraceptive supply and worse 
healthcare in general, leading to high gonorrhea incidence (Jones et al. 2002). On the other 
hand, if sexual activity is a normal good wealthier societies may show higher STD rates.  
The vector Xit also includes the percent share of the population aged 15-24. Since this 
is the age group with the highest likelihood of contracting gonorrhea (Lowndes and Fenton 
2004b) we expect a positive coefficient on this variable. Further, we incorporate urbanization 
and population density to account for the role of remoteness and agglomeration in the 
development of legal norms and the transmission of STDs (Dehne et al. 2002). Finally, as 
previous work by Dee (2008) has found that the right to same-sex-marriage can lead to 
changes in STD incidence, we also include an indicator variable that equals 1 if a country 
grants such rights and 0 otherwise. 
   Our regression controls for common period effects in gonorrhea incidence through νt. 
The country fixed effects λi absorb time-invariant country characteristics like cultural and 
religious norms that may affect both abortion legislation and the frequency of gonorrhea. The 
country effect is also useful because it allows us to control for the country difference in 
gonorrhea surveillance systems that we discuss in the appendix.  In some specifications we 
include country specific time trends in gonorrhea incidence that are not captured by the year 
indicators and our other controls. 
In models that include the country trends, we identify the abortion effect through the 
discrete change in abortion legislation and the change in gonorrhea incidence across all 
countries right around the time of legal reforms. By contrast, in models without such trends, 
identification is provided by the change in gonorrhea incidence for countries that changed 
their abortion law over the sampled period.   11
V. DATA 
We obtained gonorrhea incidence data
22 for Europe and Central Asia from WHO’s 
European Health for All Database (World Health Organization 2009). The WHO collects data 
from national sources. For the United States and Canada, we obtained incidence data directly 
from their national STD surveillance agencies (Center for Disease Control 1994, 1998, 2002, 
and Public Health Agency of Canada 2008). 
Because there are no internationally binding guidelines for the collection of gonorrhea 
data, the accuracy and detail of reported incidence rates vary between countries and across 
time. Countries differ in their capacity to identify individuals who have contracted gonorrhea. 
Further, even though we only consider countries which mandate physicians to report 
gonorrhea cases to the national surveillance agency, physician reporting rates differ across 
countries (See Lowndes and Fenton 2004a, Panchaud et al. 2000, Dehne et al. 2002, Van 
Duynhoven 1999).  We describe the variation in data collection methods and data quality in 
further detail in the appendix.  As discussed in the previous section, the inclusion of country 
fixed effects and country-specific time trends in our model enables us to control for some of 
these differences. 
We obtained the GDP per capita and CPI time-series online from the United States 
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (United States Department of 
Agriculture 2009). To obtain estimates of the total population, the share of the population 
aged between 15 and 24, the degree of urbanization and population density, we used the 
United Nation’s World Population Prospect (United Nations 2007). Because these data are 
available only in five year intervals, linear interpolation was used to fill the data gaps. Data on 
same-sex-marriage laws was acquired from Dee (2008) and other online sources. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables in our empirical models. 
                                                       
22 For the robustness checks in Section VII, we also acquired data on syphilis, malaria, and tuberculosis.   12
VII. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the results of our econometric analysis. Columns 1, 3, and 4 of Table 
3 report coefficient estimates for models that measure abortion access with an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if abortions are legal on request or on socioeconomic or mental health 
grounds, and 0 if abortions are legal only to save the woman’s physical health or life. 
Columns 2, 5, and 6 present results for models that include two separate indicator variables 
for laws that permit abortions on request and for laws that permit it on socioeconomic or 
mental health grounds. Because in all specifications our reference category are laws that allow 
abortion only to save the woman’s life or to preserve her physical health, the reported 
coefficients measure the impact of improved access to abortion relative to the most restrictive 
legislation.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show regression results with no covariates other than the 
abortion variables, no year and country effects and no trends. 
The specifications presented in columns 3-6 include country and year effects and the full set 
of control variables. In addition, the specifications shown in columns 4 and 6 include country 
trends.
23 
Below each coefficient estimate, we report two standard errors. The first row below 
each coefficient shows Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. In the second row 
below each coefficient and in brackets is the standard error adjusted for clustering at the 
country level. The latter standard error allows for serial correlation in the error term (Bertrand 
et al. 2004).  It also helps account for dependence arising from the potentially different 
methods of collecting the STD data across countries. 
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show that more liberal legislation is 
associated with higher gonorrhea incidence. Column 1 indicates that laws which permit 
                                                       
23 We also estimated specifications with country and year effects with and without country trends which did not 
include any further control variables. The results were qualitatively similar to those presented in columns 3-6 of 
Table 3 and are and available from the authors on request.   13
abortion on request or on socioeconomic or mental health grounds are associated with 82 
more gonorrhea infections per 100,000 individuals. Disaggregating this effect in column 2 
shows that the previous result is primarily driven by the differences in gonorrhea incidence 
between laws which make abortion available on request and laws that permit abortion only to 
save the woman’s physical health or life. The point estimate on abortion on request show that 
this legislation is associated with 107 additional gonorrhea infections per 100,000 individuals. 
In contrast, the difference between abortion legal on socioeconomic and mental health and 
abortions legal to save the mother’s life or her physical health is 10 infections per 100,000 
individuals, and this difference is not statistically significant. 
In columns 3 and 5 of Table 3 we add the full set of controls and country and year 
fixed effects. The results show a positive effect of easier abortion access on gonorrhea 
incidence. For specification 3 we find an increase of 46 new infections in comparison to laws 
that permit abortion only to preserve the woman’s life or health. The coefficient estimates for 
the alternative specification in column 5 suggests that the incidence of gonorrhea increases by 
70 if abortion is available on request and by 47 if abortion is legal on socioeconomic or 
mental health grounds.  
The results are qualitatively similar when we include country trends in specifications 4 
and 6, although the point estimates in these specifications are smaller. In column 4 we find 
that easier access to abortions leads to 33 additional cases of gonorrhea. Column 6 shows that 
compared to column 5, the rather large difference between abortion available on request and 
abortion available on socioeconomic or mental health grounds is getting smaller. In 
comparison to laws that permit abortions to save the woman’s physical health or life, abortion 
on request leads to an increase of 37 gonorrhea cases, while abortion legal on socioeconomic 
or mental health grounds leads to 32 additional cases.    14
VII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
One concern regarding the identification of our estimated effect is if the introduction 
of new abortion laws coincides with a change in the accuracy of gonorrhea surveillance. 
There is no strong reason to suspect this for the Western countries in the sample. However, in 
Eastern Europe, the political and socioeconomic upheaval of transition weakened disease 
surveillance (Panchaud et al. 2000, Dehne et al. 2002). At the same time, a number of Central 
and Southeastern European countries in our sample reformed their abortion law. Because 
these countries liberalized abortion policies and because worse monitoring led to lower 
reported gonorrhea incidence, we may bias our estimate of the effect of abortion law 
liberalization on gonorrhea incidence. Therefore, similar to Dee (2008), we present estimates 
of the effect of different abortion laws on gonorrhea incidence for three subsamples (Table 4). 
Table 4, row 1 repeats the results of the full sample estimation we presented in columns 5 and 
6 of Table 3. Table 4, row 2 shows the coefficient estimates from a sample which excludes all 
former socialist countries. All coefficients show the predicted sign and are larger for laws that 
permit abortion on request than for laws that permit abortion on socioeconomic or mental 
health grounds. Only in the specification that includes country trends are the abortion law 
point estimates larger than for the full sample estimation presented in row 1. 
Table 4, row 3, shows coefficient estimates for a subsample that omits observations 
from former socialist countries before 1992. Again, the coefficient signs are consistent with 
our predictions, and as before, the coefficient on laws that permit abortion on request is larger 
than the coefficient for laws that abortion on socioeconomic or mental health grounds. 
In addition all coefficients in row 3 are larger than those in row 1, supporting that 
there was a simultaneous weakening of gonorrhea surveillance and liberalization of abortion 
law in the former socialist countries. 
As a further robustness check, we estimated the effect of abortion laws using only 
observations from the nine countries which adopted a new law during the sample period. The   15
results are presented in Table 4, row 4. Since our analysis is based on nine countries, we do 
not report standard errors with clustering at the country level. The coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant, show the predicted sign, and, for the specification that includes 
country trends are of similar magnitude as those estimated for the full sample in row 1. 
  To examine whether we are simply picking up the effects of unobserved changes in 
health attitudes and policies, in Table 5, we present estimates for the effect of abortion law on 
the incidence of syphilis in row 2, tuberculosis in row 3 and malaria in row 4. Table 5, row 1 
repeats the coefficient estimates for gonorrhea which are also shown in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 3. Because syphilis is primarily a homosexual disease we predict a small, if any, 
abortion law effect on syphilis incidence. Tuberculosis and malaria are not sexually 
transmitted. Thus, a positive and statistically significant effect of abortion laws on 
tuberculosis and malaria would suggest that our prior conclusions about gonorrhea incidence 
are at least in part an artifact of omitted variables bias.  
The results presented in Table 5 are consistent with our predictions. We find no 
systematic evidence with respect to these other diseases.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether decisions on sexual activity are driven 
by considerations of costs and benefits, and not merely a product of instincts and long-term 
socialization. To test this hypothesis, our empirical approach relates abortion laws of different 
restrictiveness to gonorrhea incidence which is our proxy for risky sexual behavior. In our 
econometric analysis we use data from 41 countries for the 1980-2000 period. 
Consistent with our theoretical prediction and consistent with the results of Klick and 
Stratmann (2003, 2008), we find that compared to legislation that only permits abortion to 
save the woman’s life or her physical health, less restrictive abortion policies lead to   16
significantly higher gonorrhea incidence. In addition, the marginal effect of laws which make 
abortion available on request is generally larger than the effect of more restrictive laws which 
permit abortion on socioeconomic and mental health grounds.   
The basic result that increased abortion access is associated with an increase in risky 
sex has now been demonstrated in three separate samples covering different periods, counties, 
and types of laws. Our results suggest that human disease spread models can be improved by 
including a behavioral component to generate more reliable results. Further, the finding that 
more liberal abortion laws lead to an increase in risky sex may help practitioners to quantify 
and safeguard against possible public health repercussions of abortion liberalization.   17
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APPENDIX: GONORRHEA SURVEILLANCE ACROSS COUNTRIES 
The most common method to collect data on the frequency of gonorrhea is to mandate 
physicians or laboratories to report new cases to a central surveillance agency. Other 
surveillance systems, like those of Belgium and France obtain incidence data from voluntary 
sentinel studies in which participation is however often low or varies substantially over time 
(Lowndes and Fenton 2004a, Panchaud et al. 2000).
24 We therefore limit our sample to 
countries where incidence data is obtained through mandatory case reporting.  
Nevertheless, even in the limited sample certain comparability issues remain. Despite 
case reporting being mandatory in all sample countries, the share of diagnosed gonorrhea 
cases physicians actually report to surveillance agencies differ substantially between countries 
(Lowndes and Fenton 2004a). For Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Scandinavian 
and the former socialist countries, the reporting rates are estimated to be 70 percent or higher, 
whereas they are 50 to 70 percent for the United States and Switzerland. For Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Italy
25, underreporting is most severe with at 
least every second diagnosed case not being registered in the official statistics. These 
differences are often ascribed to the setup of healthcare systems. If private providers and 
general practitioners play an important role, reporting tends to be lower than in public 
healthcare systems with specialized STD care institutions. Further, not all countries require 
laboratory confirmation of diagnosed cases before they are registered in the official gonorrhea 
statistics (Lowndes and Fenton 2004a and Panchaud et al. 2000).  
Moreover, countries vary in their capacity to identify gonorrhea cases in the first 
place. The difference between the number of infections and the number of diagnosed cases 
has several causes. In poorer and sparsely populated areas, the remoteness of healthcare 
                                                       
24 For Belgium, the sentinel system covers up to 40% of laboratories but does not include the Brussels 
metropolitan region that represents some 10 percent of the population. For France, it is estimated that only 5 
percent of laboratories that test for gonorrhea participate in the studies. See Panchaud et al. (2000) 
25 For Italy, Greco et al. (1990) estimate that gonorrhea-cases are 5-150 times less likely to be reported in 
comparison to other European and North American countries. According to Lowndes and Fenton (2004a) the 
situation has somewhat improved in the 1990s, but reporting rates remain low.    21
facilities reduces diagnosis rates as people often resort to self-medication (Dehne et al. 2002).
 
Self medication is also more frequent in societies that stigmatize STDs.
26 Other factors are 






26 For Italy, Dal Conte et al. (2001) report that while only 3303 gonorrhea cases where officially registered in 
1981, 127,000 units of gonorrhea medication where sold during the same year.  
27 Most countries subject only certain high-risk groups like sex workers to routine screenings. More universal 
screening may lead to much higher reported incidence because gonorrhea can in many cases remain 
asymptomatic. See Van Duynhoven (1999). 
Screening and partner notification are more comprehensive in the newly independent states and Scandinavia. In 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States partner notification is recommended but non-mandatory. 
Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, do not have partner-notification policies.   22






CATEGORY A BORTION LAW 
FORMER SOVIET STATES 
Armenia  1980-87, 1990-99  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Azerbaijan   1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Belarus  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Estonia  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Georgia  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Kyrgyzstan  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Latvia  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Lithuania  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Moldova 1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Russia  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Tajikistan  1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
Uzbekistan 1980-2000  Request  Based on 1955 (23 Nov)  Edict of the Soviet Union 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIAN STATES 
Croatia  1980-2000  Request  1978 (21 Apr) Law no. 1252-1978  
Serbia  1980-2000  Request  1977 (30 Jun) Act on Termination of Pregnancy. 
Slovenia  1980-2000  Request  1977 (20 Apr) Law on Right to a Free Decision regarding Birth 
Macedonia  1980-2000  Request  1969 (26 Apr) Decree on Pregnancy Termination 
OTHER FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
Albania  1980-1990  Life/Physical  1977 (15 Jun) Criminal Code, sect. 95 
  1991-2000  Request  1991 (29 Apr) Law no. 7491, art. 16/1995 (7 Dec) Law no. 8045 
Bulgaria  1985, 1988-89  Mental/Socioec.  1973 (Apr) Decree no. 0-27 of Ministry of Public Health, amend.: 1974 
  1990-2000  Request  1990 (2 Feb) Decree no. 2 of Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Czech Republic  1980-1986  Mental/Socioec.  1973 (16 May) Decree no. 69-71 
  1987-2000  Request  1986 (Oct 20) Law no. 73 
Hungary 1980-1992  Mental/Socioec.  1973  Resolution no. 1040 of Council of Ministers; 1973 ordinance no. 4 
Minister of Health; 1986 (23 July) Ordinance 3 
  1993-2000  Request  1992 (17 Dec) Law no. 79 on Protection of the Life of the Fetus 
Poland  1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1956 (27 Apr) Law no. 61, 1990 (30 Apr) Ordinance of Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare; 1993 (7 Jan) Law on Termination of 
Pregnancy, repealed in 1996, re-enacted in 1997 
Romania  1980-1989  Mental/Socioec.  1966 (29 Sep) Council of State Decree no. 770, last amended in 1985 
  1990-2000  Request  1989 (26 Dec) repeal of former law; 1996 (5 Nov) Law no. 140 
WESTERN EUROPE AND ISRAEL 
Austria  1980-2000  Request  1974 (23 Jan) Federal Law 
Cyprus  1984-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1974 Criminal Code, sec. 167-169 & 169A, amend.: 1986 Law no. 186 
Denmark  1980-2000  Request  1973 (13 June) Law no. 350, amend.: 1995 (14 June) Law no. 389  
Finland  1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1978 (14 July) Law no. 564; 1985 (12 July) law no. 572 
(W.) Germany  1980-89, 1991-92  Mental/Socioec.  1976 (18 May) penal code sect. 218  
  1993-2000  Request  1993 (28 May) Const. Court decision, new law in effect 1995 (1 Oct) 
Iceland  1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1975 (27 May) Law no. 25 
Ireland 1989-2000  Life/Physical  1861  Constitution, Offences against the Person Act 
Israel  1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1979 (16 Dec) Amendment of 1977 (31 Jan) Penal Law 
Italy  1980-2000  Request  1978 (22 May) Law no. 194 
Luxembourg 1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1978 (15 Nov) Penal Code, title VII, chapter I, art. 348-353 
Netherlands  1982-2000  Request  1981 (1 May) Law on Termination of Pregnancy 
Norway  1980-2000  Request  1978 (16 Jun) Law no. 66, Sec. 1-14 
1980-1983  Life/Physical  1886 (16 Sep) Criminal Code, sect. 385  Portugal 
1984-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1984 (11 May) Law no. 6, sect. 139-141 
1982-1985 Life/Physical  1800s  Spain 
1986-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1985 (5 July) Organic Law No. 9 
Sweden  1980-2000  Request  1974 (14 June) Abortion Law (no. 595), amended 1995 (18 May) 
Switzerland  1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1937 (21 Dec) Penal Code, art. 118-120 (last amended 1942) 
UK*  1980-2000  Mental/Socioec.  1967 Abortion Act, amended 1990 
NORTH AMERICA 
US 1980-2000  Request  Nationwide:  1973 Supr. Court decisions (Roe v. Wade; Doe v. Bolton) 
Canada 1980-1987  Mental/Socioec.  1969  Criminal Code, sec. 251 
  1988-2000  Request  1988 Const. Court decision (R v .Morgentaler) 
*Excluding Northern Ireland 
Source: United Nations (2002)  23
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE D ESCRIPTION M EAN SD  SOURCE 
DISEASE        
Gonorrhea Incidence  Gonorrhea cases per 100,000 population  54.91873    66.42079 
Syphilis Incidence  Syphilis cases per 100,000 population  14.45713  32.26543 
Malaria Incidence  Malaria cases per 100,000 population  4.052344    28.88053 




ABORTION LAW        
Request/Socioec./Mental  =1 if abortion legal to preserve the woman’s 
mental health, for socioeconomic reasons, 
and on request; =0 if abortion legal only to 
preserve the woman’s physical health or life. 
.969988     .1707228 
Mental/Socioec.  =1 if abortion legal to preserve the woman’s 
mental health or on socioeconomic grounds; 
=0 otherwise  
.3037215    .4601401 
Request  =1 if abortion legal on request; =0 otherwise  .6662665    .4718291 
Life/Physical  =1 if abortion legal to save the woman’s life 
or preserve her physical health;  =0 otherwise 
.030012     .1707228 
UN 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
      
GDP per Capita  Real per capita GDP in 2005 US-Dollars  15447.45    14900.77  USDA 
CPI≥100%  =1 if annual inflation higher than 100 
percent; =0 otherwise 
.0852341    .2793975 
25%≤CPI<100%  =1 if annual inflation between 25 and 100 
percent; =0 otherwise 
.0828331    .2757954 
5%≤CPI<25%  =1 if annual inflation between 5 and 25 
percent; =0 otherwise 
.2821128    .4502984 
CPI<5%  =1 if annual inflation lower than 5 percent; 
=0 otherwise  .5498199    .4978107 
USDA 
Population  Total population (linearly interpolated)  22687.35    46449.95  UN 
Population 15-24  Percentage of population aged 15-24 (linearly 
interpolated) 
15.71966    2.411938  UN 
Urbanization  Percentage of population living in urban 
agglomerations (linearly interpolated) 
64.79254    15.56156  UN 
Population Density  Population per square kilometer (linearly 
interpolated) 
97.45202    81.45567  UN 
Same Sex Marriage  =1 if same sex marriage legal; =0 otherwise  .039489  .1948684  Dee (2008), 
online sources 
CDC: Center for Disease Control 
PHAC: Public Health Agency of Canada 
WHO: World Health Organization 
UN: United Nations 
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture  24
Table 3: Panel Estimation Relating Abortion Access to Gonorrhea Incidence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









 [48.10612]*    [21.36]**  [8.166]***    
        
Request  .  107.3509  . . 70.42 37.11 
    (18.19131)***    (17.77)*** (17.70)** 
    [52.49267]**    [47.27] [18.15]** 
          
Socioec. / Mental  .  10.50184  . . 46.99 32.43 
    (10.74317)    (13.89)*** (15.17)** 
    [20.76016]    [21.78]** [8.865]*** 
        
GDP per Capita  . . -0.0129 0.00697 -0.0122 0.00702 
    (0.00189)** (0.00271)** (0.00176)***  (0.00271)*** 
    [0.00531]** [0.00409]*  [0.00447]***  [0.00412]* 
        
5% ≤ Infl. < 25%  . . -9.737 1.734  -10.89 1.598 
    (7.149) (4.443) (7.390) (4.530) 
    [9.846] [2.811] [9.839] [2.913] 
        
25% ≤ Infl. < 100%  . . -5.332 15.09  -6.258 15.01 
    (9.510) (6.650)**  (9.488) (6.659)** 
    [12.81] [4.271]***  [12.86] [4.144]*** 
        
100% ≤ Infl.  . . 45.84 59.40 44.76 59.26 
    (14.74)*** (11.74)*** (14.78)*** (11.82)*** 
    [24.69]* [22.44]**  [25.19]* [22.55]** 
        
Population 15-24   . . 5.457 5.499 6.092 5.595 
    (2.246)**  (1.765)*** (2.273)*** (1.840)*** 
    [4.155] [2.441]**  [3.918] [2.454]** 
        
Urbanization  . . 6.640 1.117 6.929 1.173 
    (1.959)*** (2.776)  (2.044)*** (2.802) 
    [6.222] [4.261] [6.586] [4.176] 
        
Population Density  . . -0.573 -4.986 -1.550 -5.026 
    (0.747) (1.389)***  (0.727)**  (1.382)*** 
    [2.216] [2.806]*  [1.820] [2.781]* 
        
Same  Sex  Marriage  .  .  42.01 10.90 45.38 10.91 
    (14.76)***  (9.685)  (14.98)***  (9.722) 
      [43.93] [18.11] [44.88] [18.18] 
        
Country  Effects  N N Y Y Y Y 
        
Time  Effects  N N Y Y Y Y 
        
Country  Trend  N N N Y N Y 
        
R2  0.973 0.854 0.922 0.981 0.922 0.981 
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and standard errors with clustering at the country level in 
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The dependent variable is the number of individuals per 100,000 who are diagnosed with gonorrhea in year t in 
country i. Columns 1, 3 and 4 show estimation results for models that use the indicator abortion variable that 
equals 1 if abortion is legal on request or on socioeconomic or mental health grounds and 0 if abortion is only legal 
to save the woman’s life or to preserve her physical health. Columns 2, 5 and 6 show estimation results for models 
that use indicator variables derived from the three category abortion law categorization; the omitted reference 
category is abortion legal to save the mother’s life or to preserve her physical health. Each regression is estimated 
with population weights; n=883.   25
Table 4: Estimates of the Effect of Abortion Laws on Gonorrhea-Incidence by Alternative 
Sample Constructions 
  Without Country Trends    With Country Trends 
 Request  Socioec./Mental   Request  Socioec./Mental 
Sample Size 
            
70.41798 46.99326    37.10799 32.43084  833 
(17.77065)*** (13.88598)***    (17.69919)*** (15.17463)**   
[47.27474] [21.77599]**    [18.14525]**  [8.864602]***   
(1) Full Sample 
         
            
68.17129 14.28038    57.04757 37.67491  381 
(25.48491)*** (18.60257)    (19.53646)*** (15.38662)**   
[72.88968]  [38.77754]   [23.85854]** [9.854424]***   
(2) Only Western 
countries 
         
            
77.19773 34.51146    50.6881  38.9389  578 
(25.54327)** (19.96245)*    (19.99465)** (15.69759)**   
[72.69795] [38.34891]    [21.3501]**  [9.33283]***   
(3) Excluding Obs. 
from former 
socialist countries 
before  ‘92           
            
52.40767 54.35264    41.81123 33.14881  176 
(12.99026)*** (11.36588)***    (11.7827)***  (11.39021)***   
         
(4) Only countries 
that reformed 
abortion law 1980-
2000           
            
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and standard errors with clustering at the country level in 
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
We do not present clustered standard errors in row 4 because of the limited number of countries in the sample. 
The dependent variable is the number of individuals per 100,000 who are diagnosed with gonorrhea in year t in 
country i. The Full Sample estimates presented in the first row of this table correspond to those presented in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 3. Each regression is estimated with population weights.   26
Table 5: Estimates of the Effect of Abortion Laws on the Incidence of Different Infectious 
Diseases 
  Without Country Trends    With Country Trends 
 Request  Socioec./Mental   Request  Socioec./Mental 
Sample Size 
            
70.41798 46.99326    37.10799 32.43084  833 
(17.77065)*** (13.88598)***    (17.69919)*** (15.17463)**   
[47.27474] [21.77599]**    [18.14525]**  [8.864602]***   
(1) Gonorrhea 
         
            
-10.23356 8.239978    -29.0629  -22.87311  777 
(9.939602)  (5.831033)   (12.51614)** (9.81443)**   
[24.31381] [10.14329]    [14.7206]* [10.33511]**   
(2) Syphilis 
 
         
            
(3) Malaria  -1.3796  -1.00513    1.23406  1.123304  789 
 (1.179852)  (.9951384)    (.7325093)*  (.6027402)**   
 [2.11096]  [1.735589]    [1.242148]  [1.236559]   
           
            
(4) Tuberculosis  5.79003  6.053134    2.900203  2.307471  815 
  (3.848057) (3.326122)*    (4.485397) (4.313555)   
  [10.17125] [6.642437]    [3.786059] [2.789017]  
          
            
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and standard errors with clustering at the country level in 
brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The dependent variable is the number of individuals per 100,000 who are diagnosed with gonorrhea, syphilis, 
malaria, or tuberculosis, respectively, in year t in country i. The Full Sample estimates presented in the first row of 
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